Erik Sass is cover the consequence of the war exactly 100 age after they happened . This is the 262nd installment in the series .
13 January 2025: Germany’s Fateful Gamble
The most portentous decision of the First World War was made on January 9 , 1917 , at a top - undercover meeting of Germany ’s civil and military leader at Pless Castle in Silesia in Eastern Germany . Here , at the goad of boss of the universal faculty Paul von Hindenburg and his close collaborator , first quartermaster Erich Ludendorff , Chancellor Bethmann - Hollweg reluctantly agreed to the resumption of unrestricted U - boat war – a gamble that would decide the outcome of the warfare .
As 1917 began , Germany ’s strategical options were specialise . The program of the previous honcho of the general faculty , Erich von Falkenhayn , to leech France white at Verdun had succeeded in causing massivecasualtiesbut failed to split the Allies or rap France out of the war , as skip . Germany ’s main allies , Austria - Hungary and the Ottoman Empire , were both on the defensive attitude , requiring more and more assistance to simply last , and the coincidental Allied offence at theSommeand inGaliciahad sorely taxed German work force and material .
US National Archives , viaThe Atlantic
Meanwhile Germany ’s vast industrial machine was bit by bit being stretched to the limit , while shortages of food and fuel stir grow discontent in the civilian population . The indecisiveBattle of Jutlandin May 1916 left the Allied naval encirclement undisturbed , and Britain ’s borrowing ofconscriptionwas putting several million young soldiers in the field of operations .
But Hindenburg and Ludendorff believed that victory was still within range , provide Germany acted boldly and swiftly . Indeed the Allies also found themselves overstretched , as France reached the limits of her own manpower trace Verdun and the Russians suddenly find out themselves responsible for for shoring up Romania , or what wasleftof it . Further , as before Germany enjoyed the advantage of a primal spatial relation , allow it to move forces between various fronts and perhaps kill its enemies “ in point , ” or one at a time .
In edict to tap these opportunities , in 1917 Hindenburg and Ludendorff chew over yet another shifting in focal point , this time from west to east ( reverse Falkhenhayn ’s earlierswitchfrom east to west ) . On the Western Front , they planned a surprisal withdrawal from the Somme to massive , newly constructed fortification at the Siegfried Line – eff to the Allies as the Hindenburg Line – shorten the front by around 25 miles and release up two whole armies for service elsewhere .
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By going on the defensive attitude on the Western Front , they hoped , Germany would be able-bodied to have a KO blow to Italy , Russia , or both ; Russia in exceptional was alreadyteeteringon the edge ofrevolution , and the incompetent tsarist regime just needed a final push before it collapse .
However Hindenburg and Ludendorff realized that simply shortening the Western Front and digging in would n’t be enough : they also had to ratchet up the pressure on Britain for keep the British from launching a fresh offence like the Somme , and maybe even criticise them out of the war . To carry through this they pinned their hopes on a raw ( but no longer hidden ) weapon : the submarine .
“Germany Is Playing Her Last Card”
Germany had already tried nonsensitive uranium - boat war twice , loose a growing fleet of submarines on Allied and neutral shipping , with license to settle unarmed merchant ships without warning . But on both occasions these political campaign were finally suspend ( firstin the summertime of 1915 , thenagainin the spring of 1916 ) in the grimace of objection from neutral countries , specially the United States of America , over civilian casualties .
The menace of war with the U.S. had force Berlin to back down twice , but by early 1917 Germany ’s leader were willing to take the risk . A issue of ingredient contribute to this shift , include the general sense that fourth dimension was working against Germany , as well as public demand for revenge in variety against the “ Starvation Blockade ” maintained by the British Royal Navy . The steady growth of Germany ’s U - gravy holder fleet also held out the hope of a decisive result .
Most crucial , however , were Britain ’s growingdependenceon U.S. signification to sustain its war effort , a vulnerability which could be exploit by attacks on shipping , and the ensue enmity of Germany ’s young military leaders , Hindenburg and Ludendorff , towards the U.S.
harmonise to the U.S. ambassador to Berlin , James Gerard , in the declination of 1916 Ludendorff was on the record as state that “ he did not believe America could do more damage to Germany than she had done if the area were actually at warfare , and that he considered that , much , America and Germany were engaged in hostilities . ” With the ascendancy of Hindenburg and Ludendorff over Germany ’s civilian government – in effect a exsanguine military coup countenance by Kaiser Wilhelm II – the Libra of political mightiness in Berlin shifted towards open opposition .
The minutes of the meeting on January 9 , 1917 , make clear that Bethmann - Hollweg was now playing 2nd fiddle to Hindenburg and Ludendorff , public heroes who enjoyed the backing of the fickle monarch . Germany ’s drawing card also allowed themselves to be swayed by affirmative thought process , in the shape of cheery projections from the Admiralty about how quickly British morale and war - micturate capacity could be destroyed through unrestricted sinkings .
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Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff , who headed the Admiralty ’s analytic part , calculated that Germany ’s get U - boat fleet could sink 500,000 - 600,000 tons of British merchant marine per calendar month at first – a prognosis that evidence remarkably accurate . However Holtzendorff stray in his assumptions about the impact that this would have on Britain ’s total usable cargo ships , as the British could requisition neutral shipping and order more substitution from American shipyards . The German Admiralty also failed to anticipate Allied tactics for convoy merchant ships ( they consider convoys were ineffective , and if anything would make it easier for Cuban sandwich to find targets ) . Finally , the German high command underrate Britain ’s power to increase domesticated production by chance manufacturing substitutes , implement rationing , and impart newfangled tilled land under polish ; although ordinary British people certainly sustain from famine and chaffed at rationing , the atomic number 92 - sauceboat campaign fall far short of “ starve Britain to her knee joint . ”
every bit important to the German ( mis)calculations was the belief that America , as a mercantile but not mercenary nation , was basically unwilling to fight down , due both to her traditional isolation and what they viewed as the social and ethnical incoherence of the American population , result from the large proportion of immigrants ( including million of German stock , whom they assumed would not be loyal to their adopted land ) .
In short they predicted that the undisciplined , polyglot American rabble would resist selective service and European - style stack militarisation . Instead , any declaration of warfare would be mostly symbolic , or as Bethmann - Hollweg resume the military leaders ’ argument : “ America ’s assistance , in case she enters the warfare , will consist in the speech of food supplies to England , financial support , saving of airplanes and the dispatching of corps of volunteer . ” And its armed forces were so pathetically little that even if America did fight , Hindenburg and Ludendorff assured the civilian , Germany could gain ground the war before it had a chance to mobilize enough men to make a remainder in Europe .
It ’s worth direct out that even at this critical degree , not everyone was convinced . Indeed Bethmann - Hollweg sounded a skeptical eminence during the get together , watch , “ Admiral von Holtzendorff assumes that we will have England on her knees by the next harvest … Of naturally , it must be take on that those outlook are not capable of being demonstrated by proof . ” Nevertheless he bowed to the general ’s convictions , thus finish the submission of Germany ’s civilian government to its war machine .
When the determination was advertise at the end of the calendar month , everyone understood that Germany ’s fate was riding on the outcome . Evelyn Blucher , an Englishwoman married to a German aristocrat living in Berlin , confide in her journal : “ We all know and experience that Germany is playing her last menu ; with what final result , no one can possibly foretell . ” Unrestricted U - boat war would restart on February 1 , 1917 .
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